Title: Declassified Cold War Documents Reveal DIY Nuclear Weapon Instructions
In recent revelations, the National Security Archive has unveiled declassified documents pertaining to the "Nth Country Project," a Cold War experiment delving into the potential creation of a DIY nuclear weapon. Originating from Lawrence Livermore National Lab, the project saw three inexperienced physicists hired to design and test a nuclear device, aiming to address concerns over potential nuclear weapon spread.
The declassified data consists of a comprehensive report detailing the DIY nuke design, a briefing memo, and a heavily redacted account of a classified briefing tour given by the project team. The most intriguing addition is the newly uncovered "Postshot Activities of the Nth Country Experiment" document. This report, filled with lighthearted elements, offers a unique glimpse into the minds of the young physicists behind the DIY nuke, featuring cartoons and illustrations.
While the essence of the project remains captivating, the document's heavy redactions have left some scholars questioning its purpose. Alex Wellerstein, a Stevens Institute of Technology professor and expert in nuclear secrecy history, voiced his thoughts, stating that the redactions seem counterproductive to the primary objective of the project – to showcase the futility of excessive secrecy in preventing nuclear weapon creation.
In the wake of the atomic bomb's detonation, America's apprehensions about nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands escalated. With each new nuclear power – Russia, the U.K., France – nuclear scientists pondered the feasibility of creating a device using publicly available data and resources. Fear of nuclear proliferation gave rise to the "Nth Country Problem," and Lawrence Livermore National Lab attempted to tackle it with the "Nth Country Experiment."
The project commenced in May 1964, with a three-year period given to three dedicated PhD physicists to design a nuclear weapon, unhampered by classified knowledge. The team succeeded within this time frame, leading to the conclusion that a foreign government with sufficient resources and knowledge could build such a weapon.
This conclusion proved accurate as nuclear programs emerged in China, India, Pakistan, and likely Israel – each closely guarded by their respective governments. Intriguingly, the project's conclusion coincided with South Africa and Libya's near completion of their nuclear programs, which were later abandoned due to political reasons.
Reading the declassified documents, Wellerstein found them informative but wished for less redaction. He believed that the documents could shed light on alternative avenues of bomb design and the potential advantages of an "open-source" approach. However, he acknowledged that the necessary redactions felt unnecessary, given the project's objective.
Enrichment Data:
Despite initial impressions, the "Nth Country Project" documents are not connected to a DIY nuclear weapons project. Instead, they originated from the CIA's assessment of a hypothetical nuclear proliferation scenario. The project, conducted in the 1950s and 1960s, aimed to understand the feasibility of a country with limited nuclear experience and resources developing a nuclear weapon. The study considered various aspects, such as resource acquisition and facility construction.
The declassified data includes blueprints, instructions for building nuclear reactors and enriching uranium, and details on assembling a nuclear device. These findings were intended to offer policymakers insights into the challenges and potential risks of nuclear proliferation, as well as barriers to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.
The classification of parts of these documents remains due to the sensitivity of the information, with national security concerns and potential adversary advantages at stake. The declassification process continues to carefully review and release information, maintaining a balance between transparency and protection.
The declassified documents reveal that the "Nth Country Project" was not a DIY nuclear weapon project, but rather a CIA assessment of a hypothetical nuclear proliferation scenario. In the future, understanding the feasibility of such scenarios could be vital in preventing nuclear weapon spread.
As we look towards the tech-driven future, transparency in these types of studies could be instrumental in harnessing the power of technology for peaceful purposes and mitigating potential threats.
